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SUMMARY 
This thesis analyzes prohibitions on wearing the burqa (commonly referred to as “the burqa ban”) 
within the context of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The main objective of this thesis to, considering the rule of law, 
identify any legal issues with the burqa ban, as well as evaluate the judicial application and the 
legal intricacies within the limitation clauses enshrined under Article 9(2) of the Convention 
The hypothesis states that the judicial application of the case SAS v France under Article 9 of the 
Convention creates substantial challenges regarding the interpretation of necessity clauses as laid 
out in Article 9(2), specifically within the context of the burqa ban in France and the principle of 
rule of law. This thesis uses empirical data, authoritative sources and presents theories to test the 
validity of the judicial application of the Courts decision and its jurisdiction in the application of 
Article 9 of the Convention. Further, while evaluating the significance of the legal issue, the 
present research aims to provide an objective legal view of the situation. 
The thesis is composed of four chapters, each devoted to a separate aspect. Chapter I explores the 
legal grounds and judicial application of the burqa ban under Article 9. It refers to competing 
interests: protection of the right to an individual’s religious autonomy v. protection of the rights 
and freedoms of other Convention norms. Chapter II analyzes the controversial character on the 
ban with respect to its application of justifiable interference of Article 9(2) on prohibition on 
religious dress.  Further, it considers the legal controversies of Article 9 of the Convention in 
relation to the burqa ban. Chapter III analyses legal concepts for justifiable interference as 
“necessary in a democratic society” which resulted in substantial challenges to the interpretation 
of Article 9 and its application in the assessment of the S.A.S. v. France judgment. Chapter IV 
turns to the practical application of Article 9 and the doctrine of a margin of appreciation.  It 
evaluates the significance of the burqa ban with respect to legal obligations. 
 
Interpretation of Article 9 and other legal norms is done by applying three interpretation methods: 
hermeneutic, argumentative and explanatory. This research is further supplemented by analysis of 
relevant case practice. Additionally, the works of legal academics are used to provide a broader 
perspective on the matter that contributes to an explanatory debate between competing views 
about the application of Article 9. Further, the requirement of cumulativeness is also explored. 
Moreover, the analysis offers an illustration of the legal controversies that have emerges 
regarding the argument of safeguarding Public Order arguing that it is necessary in a democratic 
society. One of such controversies is the role of subjectivity when interpreting the burqa ban and 
Article 9. Due to lack of consistent case law practice, this also means that its application is 
difficult to determine under the justifiable limitation clause. Finally, this may lead the burqa ban 
to fall within the scope of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which fails to objectively 
assess the legal liability on burqa ban. 
 
The thesis conclusion partly supports the research hypothesis, stating that Article 9 creates legal 
intricacies that lead to difficulties of objective interpretation in the weighing process. It has both 
theoretical (i.e. conceptual) and practical shortcomings, which requires action on the part of the 
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Court to determine the extent of Article 9 within its case law practice. This is vital in order to 
preclude uncertainty on limitation clauses on justifiable interference, provided by Article 9. 
However, it is still upon the State parties to interpret the Convention, and to cooperate within the 
Court in developing common consensus on domestic legislation at Convention standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by 
others.
1
 
Ever since the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
freedoms (hereinafter the Convention) came into force, it has served as protector of the protection 
of human rights.
2
 The Convention, according to its Preamble has established legal steps for 
collective enforcement of the fundamental freedoms and rights that are laid out in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
3
 It is a binding agreement which aim is to provide supervision of 
the observance of enshrined human rights law provisions.
4
  
 
The Convention has served as an aspiration to every Contracting Member State, when 
establishing and developing its national legal system.
5
 Every Member State (MS) has a duty to 
ensure that national authorities respect and guarantee the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention in order to maintain European Public Order, and preserve the rule of law.
6
 
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (…)7 
 Further, all the Contracting States are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter the Court) and according to its judgements shall improve the prerequisites of 
the Convention, and work as guarantors of the enshrined fundamental rights and freedoms under 
the Convention.
8
  
 
This paper concerns the fundamental right of freedom to religion or belief. This is a fundamental 
freedom and right – it is also an important foundation for a democratic society.9 The protection of 
religious freedom in a given society depends on a range of factors, degree of political and societal 
commitment to the principle of religious freedom, and the legal principles in the national 
jurisdiction for the protection of religious freedom. However, as emphasized above, the 
Convention and case-law developed by the Court plays a vital role in its implementation within 
national legislation.  
 
                                                          
1
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).p3 
2
 Theory and Practice of The European Convention on Human Rights , ed. Pieter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen 
van Rijn, Leo Zwaak. (Antwerpen ;Oxford : Intersentia, 2006),  p. 2 
3
 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Available on: http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/. Accessed May 5, 2018 
4
 Supra note 2,  p .3 
5
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms,1950 
Article 1. Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2018 
6
 Supra note 2,  p. 23 
7
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 
Article53 Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2018 
8
 Supra note 2,  p .19 
9
 Supra note 2, p .736 
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Article 9 of the Convention establishes the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Article 
9(1) protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
10
 Further, Article 9(2) 
protects the right to manifest it through worship, teaching, practice and observance.
11
 However 
Article 9(2) includes limitation clauses under certain circumstances.
12
 The limitations of Article 9 
(2) are required to fall under enshrined legal principles to be justifiable. 
 
A notable debate arises about the limitation clause in Article 9(2). The present research focuses 
on whether legislation restricting religious freedom is justifiable under the necessity clauses of 
the European Convention, specifically the prohibition of the religious dress (burqa) under the 
European Public Order. Such research is relevant as the extent of Article 9 and its limitation 
clauses for justifiable interference are unclear. Hence, such a situation creates doubts and 
complex legal controversies about the interpretation and application of Article 9. This concerns 
both theoretical aspects and practical conflicts of this basic legal principle of human rights law, 
due to difficulties in determining the precise extent of Article 9, the legitimacy of burqa ban in 
regard to the Convention. 
 
Public order is strictly governed by domestic national law with a reference to Human Rights Law. 
The question of Public order becomes complex when the MS has leeway to use broad 
discretionary power when interpreting the Convention.
13
 This use of broad discretionary power is 
called “the margin of appreciation14”. Greer notes that the margin of appreciation refers to “the 
room for maneuver the Strasbourg institutions are prepared to accord national authorities in 
fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.”15 
 
However, a lack of clarity about the extent of Article 9 and too much freedom for national 
legislation to interpret it, may risk undermining fundamental right and freedom the articles aims 
to protect. Furthermore, it may potentially undermine the importance of human rights law. In the 
case study of this thesis, the paper analyzes the situation in France where the burqa ban was 
adopted. It begs the questions of whether in a multi ethnic Europe one group can be selectively 
impacted by legislation which is supported with arguments emphasizing the history and traditions 
                                                          
10
  Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 
Article 9. Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  Accessed May 5, 2018 
11
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 
Article 9. Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  Accessed May 5, 2018 
12
 Ben Vermeulen and Marjolein van Roosmalen, “Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”, in Theory and 
Practice of The European Convention on Human Rights , ed. Pieter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, Leo 
Zwaak . (Antwerpen ;Oxford : Intersentia, 2006), pp .758-763  
13
Theory and Practice of The European Convention on Human Rights , ed. Pieter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen 
van Rijn, Leo Zwaak. (Antwerpen ;Oxford : Intersentia, 2006),  p.23 
14
 Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence 
of Diversity within Universal Human Rights, Emory International Law Review 15, (2001): p. 451. Donoho calls the 
doctrine ”one of the Court’s primary tools for accommodating diversity, national sovereignty, and the will of 
domestic majorities, while enforcing effective implementation of rights under the European Convention.” The EC 
has noted that the substance of the notion of public order “varied on account of national characteristics.” David 
Harris et al.,  Harris, O'Boyle and  Warbrick:  Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2009),  pp.14-17 
15
 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention of 
Human Rights, (Council of Europe, 2000) Available one: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17 (2000).pdf. Accessed May 1, 2018 
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of one particular country (France). France interprets the ban as falling under the limitation clause 
of Article 9 arguing for its right to safeguard public order and determining it as necessary in a 
democratic society. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that this legislation and its 
justifications have been accepted by the Court. However, legal controversies and intricacies 
continue throughout France. 
 
The thesis does not attempt to assess the political and societal commitment to religious freedom 
made by France. Instead, the thesis aims to present a broad inquiry about the Convention’s 
limitation clauses under Article 9 and in relation to the burqa ban in France. The focus of this 
thesis is to illustrate the judicial application of the legal principles of limitation clauses on burqa 
ban, specifically in the context of the ban being defined as necessity under Article 9(2). The 
analysis places emphasis on the strength of the current forms of legal protection available to 
religious individuals in France, and the approach of legislation towards the freedom of religion as 
it is prescribed under the Convention. Examples where contradictions may be present will be 
discussed. The idea that implied judicial application by France may violate the enshrined right 
and freedom under the Convention or deviate from its legal obligations due to the necessity 
clauses may not be fully substantial.  
 
Therefore the illustrated complexity coupled with certain legal controversies of the necessity 
excuse has become the main reason to choose this research topic. The conditions for the use of 
necessity argument are regulated in Article 9 of the Convention, which is going to be interpreted, 
examined and analyzed in this thesis. The purpose of this analysis is to answer on the 
justifiability of France's 'burqa ban', considering the limitation clauses of Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights under European Public Order. It aims to study how 
Article 9 was interpreted in practice, i.e. in Court proceedings. Most importantly, it seeks to 
illustrate the limitation clauses unclear extent and difficulties posed by the current judicial 
application of Article 9 on burqa ban.  
 
The following research hypothesis is proposed: the judicial application of the case SAS v France 
under Article 9 of the Convention creates substantial challenges regarding the interpretation of 
necessity clauses as laid out in Article 9(2) and considering the principle of the rule of law. 
The main argument of the thesis is that reformulation and improvement of the application on the 
extent of Article 9 is required, as the SAS v France case creates great potential for abuse and 
misdirection of the Convention. This is particularly important as the Convention is an intrinsic 
value based legal instrument for judicial application rather than a legal instrument that safeguards 
Public Order. Finally, conclusions will be drawn, summarizing and reflecting on the analysis and 
partly approving the hypothesis. 
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1. LAW AND JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF BURQA UNDER ARTICLE 9 
OF THE ECHR 
Recent legal developments on religion and burqa ban have generated intensive and ongoing 
debates concerning on legal controversies regarding religious freedoms their judicial application. 
Discourse concerns secularism
16
; principle of equality referring to the Islamic veil
17
, and 
principle of pluralism
18
. Wearing of a religious dress (burqa) in public spaces from the human 
rights perspective is viewed as an example of one’s manifestation of religion19. Accordingly, it 
falls within the scope of Article 9(2) as a qualified right, that may be subject to restrictions under 
legal grounds such as “public safety, public order, health, or morals and for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”20 However, the importance of the right of religious freedom21 is 
that it serves as protector of the very core of individual’s identity22. It concerns the deep-rooted 
beliefs and persuasion formed within one's conscience and is called forum internum.
23
 This falls 
beyond the jurisdiction of the state and does not allow any limitations and does not accept any 
determination on validity of religion or belief.
24
 In addition, the right to manifest ones religion is 
called forum externum,
25
 by which all individuals shall be subject to state’s jurisdiction with 
definite assurance of the fundamental right to obtain freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.
26
 The intent of the right of religious freedom is to safeguard and seek protection of 
human respect, dignity among every individual
27
 based on The Convention, according to its 
                                                          
16
 Claudia Morini, “Secularism and Freedom of Religion: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
Israel Law Review 43, no. 3 (2010) 
17
 Sally Pei, “Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence at the European Court of 
Human Rights”, Yale Law Journal 122 (2013) Maria Beatrice Berna, “Gender and Culture in the Legislation and 
Case law of the European Court of Human Rights.  The Case of the Islamic Veil”, Law Annals from Titu Maiorescu 
University (2014) Erica Howard, “Banning Islamic Veils: Is Gender Equality a Valid Argument”, International 
Journal of Discrimination and  Law 12 (2012) 
18Bridgette Dunlap, “Protecting the Space to Be Unveiled: Why France's Full Veil Ban Does Not Violate the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, Fordham International Law  Journal 35, no. 4 (2012)  Myriam Hunter-
Henin, “Why the French Don't Like the Burqa Laïcité, National Identity and Religious Freedom”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 61, no.3 (2012) 
19
David Harris et al.,  Harris, O'Boyle and  Warbrick:  Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2009),  pp.604-605 
20
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 
Article 9(2). Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2018 
21
 Jim Murdoch, Protecting the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2012),  p. 7 
22
 Renata Uitz, Freedom of religion: Renata Uitz. (Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 2007),  p. 31 
23
Theory and Practice of The European Convention on Human Rights , ed. Pieter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen 
van Rijn, Leo Zwaak. (Antwerpen ;Oxford : Intersentia, 2006),  p. 541 
24
 Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p.  44 
25
Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey Jacobs, White and Ovey, The European Convention on 
Human Rights, (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2014), p. 412 
26
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms,  1950 
Article 9(1). Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2018 
27
 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Resolution 2076: Freedom of Religion and Living Together in a 
Democratic Society, 30 September 2015 (33
rd
 Sitting), para.2 Accessed 7 May, 2018 Jill Marshall, “Personal 
Freedom and Human Rights”, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Autonomy,identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, International Studies in Human Rights 98 ,( Leiden ;Boston : 
Martinus Nijhoff,2008), p. 13 
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Preamble. The key goal is to ensure the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and 
to eliminate possible threats on religious freedom with unjust interferences.
28
 
 
1.1 SAS v France: legal grounds and judicial application of burqa ban (Article 
9) 
Examination of the SAS v France judgment
29
 demonstrates the legal principles which have been 
interpreted and defined, as well as the legal grounds on which the justification has been built. 
This also concerns the context of the necessity for opening interpersonal relationships that have 
served as justifiable interference (commonly referred to as “living together” or “vivre ensemble”) 
for the prohibition of burqa. The application of the Courts jurisprudence has reached a new level, 
resembling its collective opinion by upholding the ban on full face veils in public spaces. It 
shows a perspective of the Courts new judicial application within the expansion of legal grounds 
for justification by recognizing the principle of “living together”, so called vivre ensemble.30 SAS 
v France judgment unravels the religious dress relationship with competing national “public 
order” interests. The Court’s assertion demonstrates that the principle of “living together” falls 
under the entrenched legal grounds for justification, according to given limitations as: “for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”31 The question emerges whether this approach eradicates the protection of the rights of 
individual’s autonomous religious freedom or instead expends the notion of “living together” 
adding intrinsic values of general public interest as a necessity clause for justifiability. 
  
At this point, the pertinent issues on prohibition of religious dress (Islamic veil) carry subsequent 
complexities. These need to be evaluated through legal principles in lieu of the justifiability and 
balance with competing interests, in this case - between those whose freedom is to display their 
conviction through religious dress and the freedom of those who do not want to be confronted by 
it. 
1.1.2 Burqa ban competing interests: protection of the right to individual’s religious 
autonomy v. protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
As the case illustrates, it divides into two differing and withstanding positions. Those who oppose 
newly conducted judicial application and on the other hand contenders of it. Steinbach
32
 believes 
in proposed assumption and highlights that attempts to free the public space from the Islamic veil 
come at the expanse of vanishing the assured protection of the rights of individuals to religious 
                                                          
28
 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Preamble Available on: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  Accessed May 5, 2018 
29
  S.A.S. v. France, no. 43835/11,European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR), Judgment of 1 July 2014 
30
 Human Rights in Culturally Diverse Societies: Guidelines Adopted by The Committee of Ministers and 
Compilation of Council of Europe Standards, (Council of Europe,  2016), p.12 Available on: 
https://rm.coe.int/guidelines-hr-in-culturally-diverse-societies/168073dced 
31
 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 
Article 9. Available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed May 5, 2018 
32
 Armin Steinbach, “Burqas and bans: the wearing of religious symbols under the European Convention of Human 
Rights”, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law  4, no. 1 (2015), pp. 29-52 
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freedom as guaranteed by the Convention.
33
  Sanader
34
  supports this view, asserting that such a 
prohibition means a lack of proper protection of freedom of religion for individual believers. 
When protecting individual’s rights of freedom of religion, an individual's right to freedom of 
religion should be legislated in accordance with the values of the Convention.
35
Based on 
Christoffersen theory on the power balance of the Courts adjudication, it is the prime focus of 
each State to perform their obligations under the Convention and to ensure the fundamental rights 
and freedoms to everyone.  
 
Thus France is required to implement implements the Convention in its national jurisdiction. 
Hence the burqa ban can be seen to mean that France has failed to guarantee the implementation 
of the Convention in their legal domestic orders, it has deviated from its substantial legal 
obligations. 
36
 If justifiability has been presented on notion of vivre ensemble it would require 
first and foremost France to provide a purpose for the burqa ban that would align with in order to 
pertinent the Convention. However, France has not been able to provide legitimate purpose that 
strikes a balance between vivre ensemble and its legitimacy on implementing burqa ban. Yusuf
37
, 
reveals throughout his academic research a concertation on justifiability premised on the notion 
of “living together.” 38  
 
This view constitutes retrogressive implementation by undermining freedom of religion of 
individuals. It leads to reversed adjudication between the individual and the constitution of 
France. Here, arises the main question, when it is necessary to question whether this adjudication 
falls within the Convention? There are no clear limits on the justifiability from the perspective of 
competing interests. Thus, the Court in its adjudication has granted to France a constitutional 
relief. Further, based on the analysis of scholars it can be concluded to be a fundamental 
misdirection.
39
 Therefore, the limitation clauses should avoid constitutional relief, especially 
when the implementation of concepts such as the concept vivre ensemble. This is important in 
order to preserve the coherence and legitimacy of the leading judgements such as SAS v France, 
which illustrates how the goal to safeguard the rights and freedoms of others, and to develop 
standards in accordance with the values enshrined in the Convention, can be reversed and be 
shifted away from legal obligations to balance between competing interests. 
 
Within the research of this paper it is important to also look at the significance of the Islamic veil, 
burqa or any other religious form of dress. Firstly, an individual’s choice of dress is particularly 
                                                          
33
 Ibid., p.32 
34Teresa Sanader, “Religious Symbols and Garments in Public Places - A Theory for the Understanding of S.A.S. v 
France”, The Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 9 (2015) 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen, “Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power Balance of 
Adjudication be Reversed?”, in The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,2013), p.181 
37
 Hakeem Yusuf, “S.A.S. v France: Supporting Living Together of Forced Assimilation”, International Human 
Rights Law Review 3 (2014) 
38
 Ibid. 
39
Ibid., Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen, “Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power 
Balance of Adjudication be Reversed?”, in The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,2013), pp. 182-183 
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important in creating his or her identity.
40
 Moreover, a choice of dress is particularly important to 
create identity.
41
 Thus Cumper and Lewis
42
, suggest that the guiding principle shall be personal 
religious autonomy. Namely, they argue in support of a person’s freedom to wear garments of 
their choice no matter of which significance.
43
 These views represent arguments that fundamental 
human rights and freedoms must be accorded with utmost protection and limited only when 
necessary under strict scrutiny. Furthermore, only detailed and carefully scrutinized judicial 
application can display balance between competing values and rights, therefore resulting into a 
justified restriction on individual’s religious freedom.44  
However, in France’s case it happens to be “naturally” implied to preserve secular nature and 
public order within peaceful coexistence in the spirit of the notion vivre ensemble. Nevertheless, 
based on legal contradictions about judicial application, a central legal problem has been 
detected. Hence the concern is about the extent to which such interference can be justified within 
the rights to manifest one’s religion in public, while also considering the principle of 
proportionality.  
The principle of proportionality is at the very center of the frictions concerning the judicial 
applications of the justifiability of the ban on Islamic veil. This is particularly notable when 
reconciling the right of personal religious autonomy with state sanctioned curbs on religious dress 
(burqa). Hence, outward symbolism is being reduced in order to safeguard public order, and to 
ensure respect of freedom and rights of others.
45
 
Cumper and Lewis
46
 claim that by relying on such reasoning, France has used a “slippery slope” 
line of argumentation.
 47
 They state that this approach is dangerous, may put fundamental human 
rights at harm and adversely affect justice of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Respectively, one may argue that a pluralistic society has to be built on genuine recognition and 
acceptance of diversity with varied identities, which is essential to achieve social cohesion. 
Likewise, the concept of democracy includes the individual’s autonomy as an essential 
prerequisite.  
On the contrary, Benoune
48
 argues that the implemented ban by France does not concern religion 
itself.
 49
 She believes that the application of this judicial practice is not primarily religious, but 
                                                          
40Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, “Taking Religion Seriously - Human Rights and Hijab in Europe - Some Problems 
of Adjudication”,  Journal of Law and Religion 24 (2008)  Jill Marshall, “Religious Identity”, in Personal Freedom 
through Human Rights Law?Autonomy,identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human Rights,”  
International Studies in Human Rights 98 (Leiden: Boston, Martinus Nijhoff ,2008), p. 146 
41Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, “Taking Religion Seriously - Human Rights and Hijab in Europe - Some Problems 
of Adjudication”,  Journal of Law and Religion 24 (2008):  p. 599 
42
 Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, “Taking Religion Seriously - Human Rights and Hijab in Europe - Some Problems 
of Adjudication”,  Journal of Law and Religion 24 (2008)   
43
 Ibid., p.601 
44
 G.Van der Schyff and A. J Overbeeke, “Exercising religious freedom in the public space: a comparative and 
European Convention analysis of general burqa bans”, European Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 3 (2011), p. 9 
Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen, “Individual and Constitutional Justice: Can the Power Balance of 
Adjudication be Reversed?”, in The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,2013) ,p.181 
45
Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis, “Taking Religion Seriously - Human Rights and Hijab in Europe - Some Problems 
of Adjudication”,  Journal of Law and Religion 24 (2008): p. 606 
46
 Supra note 42   
47
 Ibid. 
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concerns the social and political climate of a society.
50
 At the same time, it is important to 
acknowledging one of the most known judgements in relation to religious dress: Şahin v 
Turkey.
51
 This case highlights the essence of religious freedom and its indispensable need as “one 
of the most vital element to make up identity of believers and their conception of life.”52 It points 
out the close correlation between pluralism and democracy.
53
 Parallels can be drawn with the 
recently adopted judicial application included in the SAS v France judgment. This judgment may 
be interpreted to mean that a society that adapts a ban on the full full-face veil (burqa) does not 
adhere to democratic standards because it does not apply and enforce vital guidelines in order to 
comply and be recognized as democracy.  
Golder
54
 is of the same thought and is concerned by the implication of the SAS v France 
judgment.
55
 She expresses concern that the principle of pluralism is undermined and the judicial 
application of Article 9 is misapplied.
56
 Within this reasoning, the individuals’ religious 
autonomy should be encouraged by publicly appreciating their identity – placing emphasis on 
plurality, by providing more favorable conditions for the freedom of religion. This would also 
encourage social diversity as resembled in the constitution of France, which it is entrenched by its 
core values: ‘’liberty, equality, fraternity,’’57. Meanwhile, uphold valuable principles, such as 
tolerance, pluralism and equality within Europe as a whole.
58
  
1.1.3 SAS v France justifiability of interference under Art.9 (2) on burqa 
When interference with the right to religious freedom occurs, it is important to clarify whether 
the prohibition to wear Islamic veil in public places falls within the scope of Article 9? If the 
answer is positive, is it important to evaluate whether the prohibition on Islamic veil has been 
prescribed by law? Furthermore, the attached purpose has to be genuinely applied in pursuit of 
the legitimate aim to safeguard public order. Correspondingly, it has to proceed on a solid legal 
basis. It is needed to evaluate, whether the limitation clause as laid out in Article 9(2) with 
necessary in a democratic society can be justified as a premise for this interference? The main 
goal of these considerations is to minimize the threat of an illegitimately applied interference, 
which would be a violation of the fundamental right and freedom as it is prescribed by the 
Convention.
59
 It is particularly significant to ensure legitimacy so the Court is able to provide the 
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proper validation of justifiable interference on the right of religious freedom. For interferences to 
be justified the must conform to the standards of the Convention in order to safeguard against 
arbitrary interference and to provide an adequate protection.
60
 This concerns two competing 
categories, namely public interests, referring to the state and the society, versus private interests 
of the individual – with both categories there is potential of an outcome that may endanger 
democratic values.  
 
Therefore, it is important to analyze whether the burqa ban in France has applied and is weighted 
on the basis of factual evidence within the context of justifiability; or, if instead, the legislation of 
the ban and its judicial application has been misdirected away from the very core of human 
rights. Reasoning must take into account the fact that under Article 9(2), the right to freedom of 
religion may be restricted for the protection of “public order” and “protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others” linked to the protection against public disorder.  
.  
1.2 Concluding remarks 
Only by weighing all of these above mentioned factors it is possible to discover an adequate 
response which suits these contradictions about the judicial application of the right to religious 
freedom and whether the newly implemented law and its judicial implication actually infringes 
on an individual’s right of religious freedom. This must acknowledge that freedom of religion is a 
paramount part of any individual, while every individual a core element of a democratic society.  
 
Despite notable achievements in respecting human rights, especially by Western countries, 
human rights law enforcement on fundamental rights and freedoms may still be misapplied at 
times. For example, even though Europe has been experiencing a rise of extremist activities, 
particularly those linked to religious extremism, this alone is not a solid argument to limit human 
rights. Hence, every intended act shall be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued as Article 9 
serves to strike a balance between the rights of the individual and competing societal aims to 
preserve public order. Correspondingly when an individual’s conviction is manifested in a way 
that it is made known to the outer world, the state is entitled to impose limitations only under the 
necessity clauses of Article 9(2), subject to 
 
1) prescribed by law 
2) legitimate aim 
3) necessary in a democratic society 
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2. APPLICATION OF JUSTIFIABLE INTERFERENCE OF ART. 9(2) ON 
PROHIBITION ON BURQA 
If there are restrictions of the freedom of religion or belief under Article 9(1), then it must align 
with the limitations of Article 9(2) to be a justifiable interference. It means that prohibition on 
religious dress shall be prescribed by a law, which contains a legitimate aim. This requires a test 
that aims to determine whether the prohibition or restricting measure is necessary and that it is 
proportionate to the aim it strives to achieve.
61
 
 
2.1 Prescribed by law 
The main idea behind this concept is that a legal rule includes and gives certain authorization to 
the interference. Correspondingly, in the case of SAS v France relevant domestic law authorizes 
the interference.
62
 In SAS v France the legal principles prescribed by law implies that the rule of 
law serves as valid legal rule and means the burqa ban is a justifiable interference.. 
 
The state of France, in this particular case, indicates the legal basis for its act of interference. This 
is important as otherwise the Court might be reluctant to recognize that national law has been 
properly interpreted or applied by the French national court. Hence it is important that the 
measure in question have a solid basis in domestic law. In the case of France, it shows that the 
adoption of the law which prohibits the concealment of one’s face in public places is compliant 
with the Constitution.
63
 Further, France argues that such a limitation is prescribed within the Law 
of 11 October 2010
64
 in its first three sections.
65
 The purpose is stated as:  
 (...) the Republican values of tolerance and respect for the dignity of the human being and 
to make them aware of their criminal and civil liability, together with the duties that stem 
from life in society. It also seeks to further the person’s social integration.
66  
In order to justify derogation from the right to religious freedom as in the SAS case, it must have 
a legal basis, which also extends beyond a basis of only domestic law. To achieve complete 
lawfulness, the derogation shall be imbued with the essential qualities of human rights law under 
the Convention. Lawful derogation connotes accessibility, foreseeability, certainty, with an 
understanding that this myriad of concepts is maneuverable depending on specified context of 
                                                          
61
Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, ed.  Pieter van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van 
Rijn, Leo Zwaak (Cambridge ;Antwerpen ;Portland : Intersentia 2018),  p.737 
62
 Decision n° 2010 - 613 DC of October 7th 2010. Act prohibiting the concealing of the face in public. Available on:  
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/en2010_613dc.pdf Accessed 
March 16, 2018 
63
  S.A.S. v. France, no. 43835/11, ECHR, Judgment of 1 July 2014,  para. 27 
64
 Loi  No. 2010-1192 du  Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public; Law No. 2010-
1192 of 1 October 2010 'prohibiting the concealment of one's face in public places' Available on: 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-
1959/2010/2010-613-dc/decision-n-2010-613-dc-du-07-octobre-2010.49711.html  Accessed 14 March, 2018 
65
Supra note 63, para.28 
66
 Ibid. 
14 
 
circumstances.
67
 It is to say, that it may vary from context but derogation has to be carried out 
with sufficient certainty. When a prohibition, for example the burqa ban, has a clear legal basis 
those who would prefer to wear the burqa may be convinced of the necessity of the prohibition. 
This precise balance may be difficult to establish between competing sides in such a sensitive 
matter. However, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a democratic society.
68
 Therefore it is important to discover weather an imposed 
limitation as legitimate aim applies as a least restrictive measure under the right under Article 9. 
2.2 Legal controversies on legitimate aim (public order, gender equality, 
notion of “vivre ensemble”) under Art.9 on burqa 
A legitimate aim refers only to “the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights of others.”69 Thus, in the present SAS case, the 
substance of the objectives invoked in this connection by the Government, and strongly disputed 
by the applicant, call for an in-depth examination under sufficient scrutiny. The applicant took 
the view that the ban implemented by the Law of 11 October 2010, did not correspond to Article 
9(2).
70
 The Government argued that the Law pursued two legitimate aims: public safety and 
“respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.”71 First, regarding 
public safety that government argued that wearing the burqa might be dangerous for public safety 
and has the potential of fostering identity fraud.
72
  Second, referring to “respect for the minimum 
set of values of an open and democratic society”, in order to set a balance within the interest of 
those who practice a certain religion and those who do not. The purpose of the ban as argued by 
the Government referred to three values: respect for gender equality, respect for human dignity 
and respect for the minimum requirements of life in society. With the link, to safeguard Article 
9(2) and ensure enshrined “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.73  
2.2.1 Public order  
As states in the judgment of the SAS v France, the argument for open interpersonal relationships 
has justified the burqa ban on its merits. Accordingly, when referring on the Courts statement 
“respect for minimum requirements of live in society or of “living together” can be easily linked 
to the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”74 However, the 
argument made by the French government that the notion of living together is not supported by 
any of the provisions under the Convention is not necessarily true. As dissenting judge highlights, 
the vivre ensemble concept is “far-fetched and vague.”75 
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Presumably, it is a right approach if it prevents danger and possible threats to public order, public 
safety and it falls under justifiability on legitimate aim protected by the Convention. 
76
 Thus, 
there is a question whether wearing the burqa represents a threat to public safety and public order. 
As to the individuals concerned, the prohibition compels them to give away the very core of their 
identity and the way how they manifest their identity and religious convictions outwards.
77
 It is 
important to discern what lies at the core of the willingness to safeguard public order and ensure 
public safety, and against what exactly will people be protected.  
 
Against encountering people wearing Islamic veil or against the philosophy which it is linked 
into it? Acknowledging that French people within their national territory perceive the veil as a 
“symbol of a form of subservience,”78as well seeing it as “self-confinement of any individual 
who cuts himself off from others whilst living among them”79 and that “is to break social ties and 
to manifest a refusal of living together.”80 However, the applicant clearly points out that none of 
the members of family have exerted any pressure regarding wearing the burqa emphasizing that 
for the applicant it doesn’t feel as a barrier for communication or integration, so accordingly its 
free will of her being a devout Muslim. Namely, the aim of the applicant’s manifestation is to feel 
and live in inner peace with herself.
81
  
 
Some academics support the position of the applicant and claim that the imposed ban is an 
invasion of an individual’s religious autonomy and raises major concerns on its compatibility 
with the Convention. Some question how wearing the veil is different from the approved 
practices mentioned in the Law of concealing the face.
82
 To respond to such questions the French 
government explains and provides specific examples on how the impact of public order and 
public safety by wearing Islamic veil differentiates from attires which also conceal the face, for 
example “dark glasses, or helmets.”83 At the same time, the government also stresses the essential 
values of the democratic Republic as “liberty, equality, fraternity.”84 
Considering that Europe consists of religious and cultural diversity, there should be no 
understandable reason for limitations of practices only because they are distant from French 
traditions, especially in regarding to such a fundamental right as freedom of religion or belief. 
Hence, a respectful dialogue among society on issues concerning the freedom of religion is 
important in order to foster tolerance and protect the dignity of individuals. As well, to foster a 
sense of “liberty, equality and fraternity”, consequently diminish tension, while trying to interpret 
the meaning of wearing the burqa.  
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Interestingly, the Court itself points out that wearing the Islamic veil is perceived as uncommon 
expression
85
. But on the other hand the Court concludes that it is enshrined in the values of 
democracy and that pluralism is inherent and indispensable element. Nonetheless, France 
declares that practice of wearing Islamic veil is breaching the right of others to live in a space of 
socialization, which is denial of vivre ensemble.
86
 However, there is no requirement that an 
individual should enter into contact with other people, against their own will and people “have 
right to be an outsider”. As dissenting judges’ state, otherwise shall be enunciated by a 
corresponding obligation, but would carry incompatibility with the spirit of Human Rights.
87
 
 Nevertheless, it is true that communication is important within society and that face plays a 
major role when interacting and trespassing the message to other persons. However, Nussberger
88
 
and Jaderblom
89
 note, that this vision cannot be flipped and argue that interaction among society 
is impossible if the face has been concealed. It has been supported by examples of evidence that 
are perfectly known and common in European culture. Namely, such activities, for example, 
skiing, snowboarding, and motorcycling. These practices require full coverage of the face for 
safety grounds. This serves as clear proof that people can interact without necessarily seeing each 
other’s face.90 
Yusuf believes that the prohibition brazenly violates human rights and its implementation is 
dangerous as it might lead to heightening tension and promote prejudices. Yusuf uses strong 
expression and calls it a “legalization of cultural genocide.”91 Meanwhile Vakulenko92 stresses 
that the burqa ban impacts status of the individual.
 93
 Namely, it transforms the status of women 
who are wearing the Islamic veil.
94
 It can be interpreted as a detrimental practice because of 
making a mere reformulation of the applicant’s complaint.95 It also projects a particular image of 
an applicant, namely a woman who is a devout Islam. Further, it may be seen as to imply that 
Islam is a serious threat to “democratic” European values. Thus, Marshall96 detects racial tension 
which causes disorder in France in respect to the burqa. Consequently, he proposes that 
upholding equality shall mean acknowledging differences amongst people rather than insisting on 
them to be the same.
97
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These circumstances are likely to cause inequality and unjust discrimination through burqa ban. It 
rejects a choice of each individual to make for themselves; what they want to be, what they want 
to do, including what they want to wear. Foremost, not having the burqa ban could help them to 
build up their own identity and to become an autonomous individual.
98
 Whereas, imposing the 
ban and alleging it as justifiable interference, means imposing a set of standards and refusing 
individuality with strident denial of freedom of religious autonomy.
99
 From the perspective of 
Brems, the burqa ban concerns the Convention and fundamental rights and freedoms. He notes 
that it is counterproductive as it creates negative consequences for women concerned. Based on 
Brems theory the burqa ban is disproportionate and violates the Convention with respect to all 
three of the stated purposes:  
(…) (1) they restrict women's rights instead of furthering them; (2) they reduce social 
interaction; and (3) they expose women to serious safety risks. 
100 
 
In the end, what matters is if the reasons pleading for implementing the burqa ban outweigh the 
reasons against the burqa ban to a sufficient degree. Nevertheless, the justification must be of a 
global matter rather than locally adjusted, as each individual possesses an inviolability enshrined 
in the Convention. Specifically, on the right for religious freedom, this cannot be overridden. 
This acknowledges that France as every other Member State is unified while also consisting of 
equal citizens.
101
 
 
Granting all this, when limiting freedom of individual, it is important to consider liberty in the 
context of a common interest in public order and public safety. It is necessary to recognize Rawls 
assertion that the disruption of these conditions is a danger for the liberty of all.
102
 Furthermore, 
he emphasizes that liberty of conscience is to be restricted only when a legitimate aim exists and 
the expectation is that not implementing the restriction will damage the public order.
103
 Overall, 
the intent of human rights law is to guarantee and develop dignity and freedom of every 
individual, in an empowering manner of diversity and tolerance, based on the principle of 
equality.
104
 
2.2.2 Justifiability through the lens of the notion of “vivre ensemble”  
There exists an ongoing concern from different academics, sharing their arguments on the SAS v 
France case on notion of “vivre ensemble’’ which characterize the ideal French Republic. The 
notion of vivre ensemble brings out legal controversies. This analysis evaluates an adopted 
concept of vivre ensemble as justifiability, being accepted as an indispensable requirement which 
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qualifies as legitimate aim in order to safeguard “rights and freedoms of others”105. Some 
academics caveats notion of vivre ensemble as a legitimate aim. 
106
They argue that it goes beyond 
the enumerated boundaries of Article 9(2), and promotes forced assimilation policies against 
minorities in Europe and beyond. 
107
 Taking into account the strong emphasis placed by France 
on vivre ensemble when pleading the case, the question appears to be: if vivre ensemble is 
justified as a proportionate legitimate aim, does this come at the expense of the basic fundamental 
right of freedom of religion?  
 
Steinbach raises questions about the extent of justifiable interference, analyzing whether the legal 
basis is or is not absent in this case.
108
 Based on the facts provided in the SAS v France case, 
there is no certain link between the burqa ban and concept of vivre ensemble. The main argument 
that appears in the case is that an uncovered face plays an essential role in human interaction. 
Moreover, due to the established consensus in France, it serves as indispensable element within 
the society in question. That is to say, that a covered face in public places breaks the social ties 
and manifests a refusal of the principle of vivre ensemble.
109
 On this basis, the ban seems to be 
proportionate to the aim pursued. Namely, the preservation of the conditions of vivre ensemble 
serves as a prerequisite to safeguard the "protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
110
  
 
 Correspondingly, the Court is therefore able to accept the fact that it may raise a barrier when 
interacting with others. This implies a understanding that the Islamic veil may distort living 
together and negatively impact socialization within French society.
111
 Dunlap
112
 agrees with the 
position of France and concludes that the burqa ban is reasonable and justifiable.
 113
 Meaning, 
that the requirement to uncover the face in public shall benefit lives in France, and shall improve 
the condition: to live more freely under the notion of vivre ensemble.
114
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To sum up, the Court in its final judgment declares that the notion of vivre ensemble does not 
breach the Convention. This is in line with the argument presented by the French government that 
the ban serves a legitimate aim. Nonetheless, some national and international human rights bodies 
regarded the burqa ban as being disproportionate.
115
 Dunlap determines throughout her research 
that the burqa ban itself includes diverse concepts. Providing analyses based on other academic’s 
piece of work, that approved statute of the ban is impermissible violation of right to religious 
freedom and serves as a product of political opportunism.
116
 The burqa ban harms fundamental 
rights and freedoms rather than fostering them. She calls the burqa ban a cynical ploy rather than 
sincere defense of Republican values.
117
 
 
Furthermore, the report “On the Wearing of the Full-Face Veil on National Territory”118, 
prepared by a commission of the National Assembly and deposited on January 2010 is an 
important document. It provides concrete fact that around 1,900 people wore the Islamic veil in 
the year 2009. That shows that it is a small proportion considering the total population of France 
of about sixty-five million, as well as the total number of Muslims living in France.
119
 The facts 
of the SAS v France leave uncertainty about the notion of vivre ensemble. The Court states that 
the ban can be perceived as justifiable interference “solely in so far as it seeks to guarantee the 
conditions of “living together”. 120 The highlighted points raise legal concerns about potential for 
serious violations of fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Due to the 
controversial notion of vivre ensemble, which is not based on any concrete provision under 
Article 9(2) of the Convention?
121
  
Additionally, upholding the ban based on the French notion of “vivre ensemble” it may be a 
misdirection. To mention, the dissenting opinion
122
 by Judges Nussberger and Jaderblom: “it 
sacrifices concrete individual rights guaranteed by the Convention to abstract principles.”123 For 
example, people are able to socialize without necessarily looking into each other's eyes.
124
 
Moreover in today’s society, in which there are varieties of forms of social interaction, it is not 
necessarily to see each other's face.
125
   
In this context, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) provides 
recommendations and emphasizes that all the Member States shall ensure the right to freedom of 
religion without impediment and without discriminatory grounds. Meaning that in compliance 
with Article 9 and the rule of law every individual should be able to  
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(…) practice their faith publicly and freely in places of worship designed for that purpose 
by themselves or in other places accessible to the general public, in accordance with their 
own rites and customs (…)126 
Accruing all of the above mentioned facts it seems excessive to respond by imposing a ban. The 
Court suggests that the notion of “vivre ensemble” principally includes being able to look into 
each other's eyes to protect “the rights and freedoms of others.”127 Hence, it concludes that the 
notion of vivre ensemble is a justifiable interference, which serves as a legitimate aim. Therefore, 
the judgment of the SAS v France seeks a central contention due to the increasing number of 
Muslims in Europe. The Court must be aware of its monumental influence and the actions must 
be under strict scrutiny, because the implementation of the burqa ban establishes an influential 
stance in human rights.
 128
  
 
Looking globally, and stepping away from the intrinsic climate of France, there is a relevant 
argument laid out by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 22 of 1993 on 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights   
 “That restriction on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion should not be 
imposed in a discriminatory manner. It noted further that: the concept of morals derives 
from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the 
freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based 
on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.”129  
Based on the Human Rights Committees statement, it seems that decision is premised on 
incompatible necessity clauses within the Convention’s jurisprudence. True, that statement made 
by the Human Rights Committee may derive from the fact that it is unconstrained by the fact that 
its decisions are not actually enforceable. However, the Court is responsible of supervision for 
legitimacy and of how its decision will be received by one of the leading members of the 
European Union – France. As a result, it is difficult to understand the basis of the decision in SAS 
v France in light of the Convention provisions.
130
 Moreover, there is the risk that the Court is 
pandering to dangerous political leanings that are currently growing throughout of Europe. The 
decision in SAS v France may signal the Court is lending to siege attitude towards Muslims in 
Europe, giving weight to anti-Muslim prejudice which has become rigid within Europe in the last 
one and half decade or so.
131
 This may endanger the current situation for the hopes for a truly 
democratic society across all of Europe. 
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2.2.3 Principle of gender equality 
When it comes to the principle of gender equality, it is essential to draw attention to the status of 
women, in relation to freedom of religion. This particularly concerns the adopted prohibition on 
wearing the Islamic veil and recognizing that the burqa ban might restrict fundamental rights of 
an individual. Opponents of the burqa ban states that in the SAS v France, the applicant’s woman 
rights have been violated, constituting a discriminative grounds.
132
Islamic veil plays a role and 
impacts legal assertions in human rights law. Thus, the harmful presence of extremism leaves 
imprints when taking “appropriate measures” on burqa ban practice. However, it is necessary to 
maintain a focus on fundamental human rights and freedoms, in order to run counter intolerance 
and violation on religious freedom. It is the key objective on alleged judgment against woman 
and her status in Europe. Especially in the SAS v France, the applicant is a woman of devoted 
Muslim religion which makes her a religious minority in France. Therefore, her fundamental 
human rights and freedoms must be emphasized. 
  
The paramount objective is to ensure a fundamental freedom and right of Article 9 and, above all, 
to firmly uphold human rights.
133
 It is essential to guarantee both freedoms in accordance with 
the equality principle –  firstly, the freedom of religion of those, who voluntarily wish to wear the 
Islamic veil and display their religious beliefs through attire; secondly, protecting freedom of 
religion of those who are being forced and coerced to wear or display their beliefs. 
  
Howard
134
 believes that burqa ban legal basis for justifiability is built on prejudices and bias of 
Islam.
135
 She argues that implementation of the ban is counterproductive and unnecessary
 
as it 
might have the opposite effect of what the ban tends to accomplish.
136
 She emphasizes that:
  
 
(…)the expression "intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief" means any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as 
its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.
137
 
Considering the purpose of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, one can argue that implementing restrictions such as 
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the burqa ban will result in exclusion rather than inclusion in society. Namely, the chosen strands 
are misdirected and move towards violation of dignity, humanity, tolerance and diversity.
 138
 
Correspondingly, the individuals who wear an Islamic veil by their own power to freely choose 
(as the applicant) are autonomous individuals who are able to decide based on their own freedom. 
Howard carries out thoughtfully valid perspective of this statement by questioning if the applicant 
has to be liberated?
139
  
 
The argument of gender equality appears to be invalid and of reverse intention which concludes 
false liberation of individuals who freely had made up their minds to wear the veil. Independently 
of the above-mentioned affirmations of the applicant, neither the Court, nor France should 
question the universal consensus of the fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the 
Convention. But instead, whenever it’s possible to embrace legal assertions that prove that all 
human rights and freedoms are universally indivisible, interdependent and interrelated within 
recognition that all human rights are inherent of dignity, respect and are equitable.
140
 
 
The resolution of the SAS v France should not undermine the value of religious freedom and its 
recognition as a fundamental right and freedom. Steinbach persistently stresses and emphasizes 
that SAS v France leaves a big question mark on the Courts extent on justifications of 
interference. Namely, there is no sufficient legal basis to protect universally adhered human 
rights as should be required.
141
 Strand
142
 believes that unequal treatment has appeared between 
different religions within a region of Europe.
 143
 In the case of France it is one of the countries 
which seeks to keep away religion from public sphere in it and calls for strict scrutiny to be 
applied by the Court to avoid inequality and imbalance.
144
  
Steinbach highlights that implementation of general ban in public sphere is encroaching on 
individual’s freedom to religion and it shall be impermissible, she states that there is no solid 
evidence of a threat towards public order or safety.
145
 However, Strand divides gender equality 
into two dimensions; structural and individual.
 146
 The structural dimension consists of an 
evaluation of the justifiability of the ban considering the necessity clause of the limitations in 
Article 9(2). The structure relies on its meaning and the customs that lay behind the Islamic veil.  
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In SAS v France, the aim of using the argument of gender equality is to limit religious 
manifestations. Meanwhile, the individual dimension is used to persuade the aim that every 
individual, in this case women have the right to equal rights in French society.  
Furthermore, the individual dimension consists of the rights and freedoms enunciated in the 
Convention in Article 9.
147
 Thus, in SAS v France case, the Court has followed the structural 
dimension and evaluation based on how this practice goes within French society and what kind of 
meaning this practice carries in itself and in the public sphere. France emphasizes and raises its 
concerns on ensuring “respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society” 
and the “respect for equality between men and women.148” However, the Court quashes the 
stance of France’s position and states that  
A State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by 
women-such as the applicant (...) unless it were to be understood that individuals could be 
protected on that basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms
149
 
Through this, the Court shows that in this particular case the individualistic dimension of gender 
equality comes over the structural dimension. This implies that every individual inclusion is 
essential in French society. Correspondingly, if France has used the principle of gender equality 
as a prerequisite in order to implement the burqa ban, then France has to provide the Court with 
concrete documentation to substantiate the necessity for prohibition on Islamic veil and it’s 
“symbol.”150 To conclude, it is not a fair statement to declare illegal religiously motivated 
customs, namely it is impermissible. Due to the fact that it is a part of French society which 
should be tolerated and treated within dignity, which means that the burqa ban could be justified 
only by proportionate legitimate aim and only if imminent threats have been perceived. If not, 
France is encroaching on individual’s religious autonomy and use of principle of gender equality 
is inadequate.
151
  
 
The situation in the SAS v France shows that religious dress has weak protection as a religious 
manifestation under Article 9. The principle of gender equality cannot be used to ban a certain 
type of religious dress, as the judgment of SAS v France shows.
152
 Even though, it is a complex 
and multidimensional issue that varies in wide spectrum of possible restrictions.
 153
 Implementing 
the burqa ban may move France in the opposite direction of what gender equality aims to 
achieve. As critics and opponents argue, a general ban is precisely the wrong way to “liberate” 
women and ensure gender equality. It has been perceived as a setback for Muslim women and 
assertion of their fundamental right to manifest in their daily living in a French society.
154
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2.3 Concluding remarks 
It is essential to highlight the notion of vivre ensemble, principle of gender equality and public 
order that serves as legitimate values and principles of France. Correspondingly, in the SAS v 
France it is complex to evaluate references made under legitimate aim for justifiability. It seems 
that the French approach may risk subjectivity on its stance on the burqa ban, due to the absence 
of a clear legal basis. Nevertheless, this chapter has formulated the problem within the framework 
of application on justifiable interference of Art.9 (2) on the burqa ban. The outcome of pros and 
cons will be confirmed in the next chapter when analyzing the validity of the meaning of those 
legitimate aims as being necessary for a democratic society, by considering the created conflict 
with the Convention. Especially considering that a democratic society is a focal point of Human 
Rights, in which the Convention serves as a basic law to reach sound assertion to safeguard 
central values of Europe and its European Public Order. 
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3. DOES BAN ON BURQA PROMOTE INTEGRATION AND CAN IT BE 
JUSTIFIABLE UNDER LIMITATION CLAUSE BEING 
“NECESSARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY”? 
The European Convention on Human Rights should be understood and interpreted in full within 
its aim. This is important to integrate a stable system that protects human dignity and democracy 
and the rule of law serves to compliment it. Nonetheless, peaceful co-habitation of different 
religious groups within society has frequently proved challenging.
155
 The history of Europe 
shares examples of extreme intolerance towards religious groups, for example, the atrocities in 
Europe during World War II. Therefore, an immediate response to prevent future genocide and 
other such atrocities was needed.  Hence, the European Convention was conceived in the 
aftermath of World War II.
156
 
This chapter is dedicated to draw parallels within the SAS v France, and analyze conflicting sides 
for implementing burqa ban and how the law on the burqa ban has left impact on Muslims living 
in France. The second paragraph of Article 9 specifies that ‘necessity’ cannot be invoked unless 
the performed act of manifestation shall be interfered and 
(…) are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
At the same time the first paragraph of Article 9 states that:  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes(...)to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. 
This wording introduces one of the cornerstones of the Article 9 – the balance of interests, which 
is the prerequisite in a democratic society. In respect to the SAS v France, it evaluates and 
identifies the main issues arising from the principles for justifiability. It illustrates how those 
principles are interpreted and enforced within the burqa ban. In addition, how does it reflect for 
those who are against the burqa ban and argue towards an incompatibility linked to a democratic 
society under the Convention? It is vital to strike a balance between the fundamental rights of 
each individual which constitutes the foundation of a “democratic society”.157 
3.1 Necessary in a democratic society 
Clearly, the freedom to manifest one’s beliefs and convictions is extremely important. Although, 
as concluded previously, it is not unlimited since public order must also be considered. However, 
the judgment in the SAS v France states that the burqa ban is necessary to secure public safety, to 
prevent identity fraud, protect rights and freedoms of others and provide open and democratic 
society.
158
Thus, the Court implies that the burqa ban has a negative impact on those who chose to 
wear the Islamic veil in the spirit of their religious beliefs. 
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As drafted in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a 
democratic society, defined by the meaning of the Convention. This freedom is  
 “one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned.”  
In a democratic society, in which several religions coexist within the same population, it may be 
necessary to place limitations on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to 
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.159 
Moreover, in order to also ensure each person’s rights and freedoms under jurisdiction of the 
Convention.
 160
 Furthermore, France has argued about the status of its democratic society. Based 
on the grounds of social cohesion and interaction, it supported arguments requiring vivre 
ensemble. France argued that the burqa ban would benefit society, maintain tolerance and 
enhance openness in a democratic society.
 
Referring to this statement, some academics express 
difficulty to relate to the legal basis for the ban in light of the Convention, considering the 
arguments offered by France.
 161
 Meanwhile Vakulenko, shares disappointment, that France is 
undermining and shaping an individual’s experiences, who mostly are woman. She argues and 
supports empirical evidence that concludes that the impact of the burqa ban on the status of 
women is incompatible within a democratic society, as it is aspired within the Convention.
162
  
 
3.1.1 Necessary in a democratic society through the principle of pluralism 
Pluralism and democracy must be based on dialogue and a spirit to reach compromise, it entails a 
differentiating consensus on religious freedom, which shall be justified in order to maintain and 
promote a stable democratic society. 
163
 Highlighting, once again that pluralism is one of the 
hallmarks of a democratic society.
164
 When an individual or groups of religious conviction go 
against human rights law, it shall be restricted. Thus, it excludes circumstances, where the views 
of a majority must prevail.  
It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race 
or religion. It shall respect all beliefs (…) 165 
 
 This means that a balance must be achieved to ensure the fair treatment of people from 
minorities and avoid any abuse of a dominant position, as democracy requires respect for the 
principle of pluralism. Therefore, national legislation cannot waive the meaning of the 
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Convention which serves as a legal basis for every State Constitution system. No legislation is 
able to disfavor a particular religious group, in this case Muslims.
166
 
 
The rule of law means that all human beings are equal before law in their rights and freedoms. 
The rule of law does not permit any type of discrimination against a particular religious group – 
in the analyzed situation in the SAS v France – Muslims who wear the Islamic veil, solely on the 
grounds being of the adopting a different religious assertion and philosophy than the majority.
167
 
If understood through these, the link between the rule of law and democracy is essential and 
correlated.  
 
Moreover, we must also consider the aftermath of the Law in April 2011, after it had entered into 
force. According to media reports women wearing the face veil became targets of physical and 
verbal assault which instead of liberating them makes their participation in social life very 
difficult.
168
 Gal-Or
169
  confirms the negative impact of the Law and denies that it achieved the 
results it was proclaimed to achieve.
 170
  Even though that the SAS v France was guided by the 
well-intentioned imperative decree of protecting an individual– a woman. Based on the Gal-Or’s 
analysis, it can be concluded that SAS v France misjudged the values at play, producing 
consequences that outweigh the original intention of securing gender equality in a democratic 
society.
171
 
 
Correspondingly, if the burdens placed on those who wear the Islamic veil are that of pressure, it 
might amount to a form of isolation within discriminatory characteristics. Furthermore, it affects 
their ability to adhere to the pattern of religious freedom in their inner choice. That helps to 
understand the applicant in the SAS v France case who claims to be subjected to such a degree of 
pressure. Therefore lead to incompatibility with the requirements of Article 9(1). However, at the 
same time, Article 9 rights might be violated by religious portrayals if going against human rights 
law under the Convention. In that case, a State may legitimately consider it necessary to take 
measures aimed on alleging it incompatible with the respect for the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion of others.  
 
In the wording of the decision it is revealed to be more than just plain wording of a judgment, it 
raises concerns about the French society’s values on religious freedom as outlined in Article 9. 
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These concerns are on the freedom of choice, the principle of gender equality, and principle of 
pluralism, as well on the human rights and fundamental freedoms as such. In this case it is 
important to consider the explanation by Evans about how a democratic society shall function 
when inspired by the Convention.
 172
 Accordingly, the judgment of the SAS v France is projected 
on the failure of the State to offer the same degree of legal protection against disproportionate 
violations to freedom of religion or belief as it offers.
173
 And second, interpreted within France 
socio-political and cultural context, it goes contrary to any legitimate aim. Therefore, it may be 
understood as the state specifically targeting persons of Islamic faith and Islam.
174
 
 
With regard to targeting religious groups of Muslims, within burden of proof about why the 
judgment on the burqa ban is counterproductive.
 175
 As it does not include certain legal basis and 
its arguments are based on bias and assumptions on burqa, which actually eradicates Islam from 
French society.
176
 Taking into consideration, the above mentioned facts, so far the argument on 
discriminatory grounds by not adhering diversity serves to represent isolation and disproportion 
to the principle of pluralism.
177
  Based on SAS v France, there is no empirical evidence or factual 
proof on possible negative consequences on wearing the burqa, in case on harming the 
Convention or distorts public order.
178
 Further, the viewpoint represented by the Commissioner 
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe is that the ban exerts improper pressures on 
individuals and impacts their inner religious belief, which can constitute Islamophobia.
179
 
Certainly, it shall not be compatible with respect for the Article 9 and the Convention as such, if 
it may cause such a reaction. 
The measure alleged within the meaning of Article 9(2) of the Convention shows that the relevant 
limitation clause “necessary in a democratic society” shall be reconcilable as it may imply further 
exclusion of Islam from French society. Meaning that any unjustified interference will have 
detrimental effect on individuality, denying what an individual considers most important and 
what is vital for an applicant’s inner religious core as in the SAS v France.180 Therefore, it is 
essential to safeguard this right through Article 9 as democracy is about plurality, openness and 
free choice for religious conviction which includes a wide range of opinions and beliefs. As the 
Court has stated in its first landmark judgment Kokkinakis v Greece
181
 under Article 9:  
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 “The pluralism is in-dissociable from a democratic society, which has been won over the 
centuries, depends on it.”182 
Consequently, the burqa ban is not necessary in a democratic society, especially if considering 
the argument to safeguard principle of pluralism. It is important to understand the particular 
importance of SAS v France, where the notion of vivre ensemble has emerged and as well the 
principle of gender equality. Thus, it cannot be considered to constitute a legal basis for the burqa 
ban’s implementation as a justifiable interference under Article 9(2). Based on this fact, the term 
vivre ensemble, meaning living together, speaks and shares the openness and straightforwardness 
of pluralism, and tolerance to secularism. In particular, that limitation clause “necessary in a 
democratic society” should protect the rights and freedoms of others, which without doubt 
includes a duty to respect every religion and guarantees religious tolerance by implying dignity 
and respect for the religious beliefs of others.
183
 Especially, taking into account, the French 
concept of secularism (laïcité), which discourages religious influence in the determination of 
state policies; thus forbidding the French government from becoming involved in religious 
affairs. Additionally, it prohibits the French government to influence the religious climate in the 
state. 
3.1.2 Necessary in a democratic society and the concept of laïcité 
Laïcité is a term coined in law that is, primarily, a French idea, and secondarily, a legal concept. 
It divides the private realm of each individual’s religious autonomy and the state which is neutral 
shall refrain from any interference in religious matters. Accordingly, all the rights in religious 
dimension shall be equally secured. Indeed, the aim of the French Law was argued to preserve 
public safety, gender equality and secularism. Assertion has been connected to the aim to 
safeguard public order. That is to say, that allowing wearing of the burqa may distort tolerance to 
religious freedom.
184
 The state of France has relied on this notion for justifiability on burqa ban. 
France tried to implement the justifiable interference with the exercise of the Convention; 
however it was dismissed, for failure to provide concrete evidence of a breach of public order. 
Referring to protection of gender equality, the objective was initiated by the assumption that 
women who wore the burqa were coerced into doing so, but no such evidence was examined 
through the legislative process.
 185
 Thus, this raises questions. What about the rights of those 
wearing the Islamic veil willingly? Whose freedom of religion would ultimately be protected?
186
 
 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that secularism in France is one of the prerequisites 
for democracy.
187
 First, it is a guarantor of freedom of religion and of equality before the law. 
Second, it prevents France from showing a preference for a certain religion or belief. 
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Consequently, the principle of secularism ensures that a State may not invoke religious matters 
when performing its legislative function. 
188
 Referring to one of the landmark judgment regarding 
the burqa ban, Leyla v Turkey, it states that only indisputable facts and certain legitimate aims are 
capable of satisfying the requirements of justifiable interference with a fundamental right 
guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. Moreover, because of the possible interference with a 
fundamental right, the Court has to accurately establish which interference for the burqa ban has 
been supported by concrete evidence and not mere affirmations.
189
 Moreover, the concept of 
secularism has its origins in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, in 
Article 10 which provides that: 
No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, 
provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
190
  
 
Thus, a majority cannot show disrespect or employ other means of interfering with religious 
freedom and their rights, simply because in a French society it does not play a dominant role in 
the religious climate. In other words, the “right of others”; the majority, cannot be imposed on the 
minority as a measure of social cohesion and mandatory engagement especially when the 
minority do not request such engagement or deem it desirable. Therefore, there is no solid legal 
justification for imposing burqa ban due as the will of the majority considering it is important to 
protect the minority.
191
  
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, (…), to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion (…)192 
Thus, it is essential to guarantee that the limitations of the burqa ban are compatible within 
genuine interests of democracy, the principle of secularism and provides evidence of such 
defense ruled under necessary in a democratic society.  
 
Being defined as a “necessity” in a secular society is understood as an adequate relation of 
proportionality between the specific and legitimate goals pursued by restriction and the nature of 
the restrictive measure itself.
193
 It means that the necessity clause for limitation and implementing 
of the burqa ban has to verify pressing social need.
194
 Accordingly, referring to the SAS v France, 
France has to ensure clear redress to the Convention in order to maintain European Public order. 
Nonetheless, fundamental freedoms and rights of every individual must be provided the primary 
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burden of protection as they fall under the Convention.
195
 In order to rule on this latter point, the 
Court must weigh the requirements of the protection of the rights and liberties of others against 
the conduct of those who wear the Islamic veil, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. The Court 
must take into consideration the current situation in France as a whole. First of all, a distinction 
has to be made between abstract danger and real possible violation based on evidence or factual 
occurrences.  
 
Based on SAS v France case merits and actual circumstances of the relevant French law on burqa 
ban, it is likely that the limitation clause and “necessary in a democratic society”, as supported by 
the French Government, was not fully met. Correspondingly, in the Dahlab v Switzerland
196
 case 
it was declared manifestly ill-founded and thus inadmissible.
 
However, the decision affirms that 
the practice of wearing the burqa is perceived as coerced and imposed on the individuals, 
therefore appears difficult to reconcile within the democratic values of tolerance, respect for 
others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination.
197
 In the Leyla v Turkey assertion was 
reached for the justification on limitation of the burqa ban, referring to the Turkish context and 
principle of secularism, whereas the Islamic headscarf had become the symbol of political 
extremist movements.
198
 In regards to that, the applicant’s freedom to manifest religion was 
restricted in order to defend Turkish secular values, as the Court noted that secularism is the 
guarantor of democratic values and the principle that freedom of religion is inviolable and the 
principle that citizens are equal, therefore considered necessary to protect the democratic system 
in Turkey.
199
  
 
Interestingly, almost all cases discussing burqa pursues the same legitimate aims enumerated in 
article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, namely the protection of public order 
and of the rights and freedoms of others.
200
 Further, the SAS v France also follows this continuity, 
where the applicant’s arguments have been negated but the focal point has been intrinsically 
underpinned by French societal values and norms. And the practice of wearing the burqa has 
been perceived as “a practice at odds with the values of the Republic,” and 
 (…) was an infringement of the principle of liberty, because it was a symbol of a form of 
subservience and, by its very existence, negated both the principle of gender equality and 
that of the equal dignity of human beings.
201 
Accordingly, persistent efforts to farther isolate the religious group of Muslims, which definitely 
amounts in effect to coercion and cannot come within the ambit of neutral provisions, how it is 
intended to be in plain wording of SAS v France judgment. 
202
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Some academics stresses that the Court has missed a very valuable opportunity to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of the ways in which restrictions imposed on the practice of veiling in 
European states contribute to further discrimination.
203
 Not relying on real concerns on possible 
restrictions on their freedom, but on the assumptions that Muslims have been forced to wear the 
burqa. Moreover, this has the potential to cause danger and “berate Muslim women for failing to 
conform to a Western image of how women should behave.”204  
 
One could say that the Court did not really care about the views and opinions of Muslim women 
who practice veiling.
205
 However, France has mentioned the Islamic veil as a practice contrary to 
the principle of gender equality without any further justification. Hence this contributes to 
statements associating the burqa with political Islamic extremist movements and placing it in 
opposition to hallmarks of democracy, and not in line with the principles of tolerance and 
pluralism.
206
 Therefore, upholding the ban on the basis of the concept vivre ensemble, the Court 
has endorsed the French Republican approach to laïcité, within preponderance to socio-ethical 
concept, whereas personal autonomy has been weighted against intrusive state acts regulating 
identity. 
 
Nevertheless, France has its own constitutional legal system; it is being one of the Contracting 
parties under the Convention that has made its own constitution within the reference to the 
superior role of the Convention to complement its system. Understanding, the fact that slogan the 
“Liberty, equality, fraternity”, shall be the motto of the Republic.207 Further, that democracy is 
the only political model compatible within Convention. Hence, as a democratic society as France 
must not prioritize other values than those enshrined in the Convention. 
3.2 Concluding remarks  
In a democratic society national authorities must be limited in their ability to attribute limitation 
clauses within their interpretation. This implies the existence of pressing social need in order to 
preserve the principle of pluralism, and principle of secularism in France case.  This chapter 
demonstrates within the analysis that burqa ban has wider implications than was presented in the 
judgment of SAS v France. In addition to laws curtailing religious freedom under the specific 
necessities of the Convention, France justifies curtailing religious freedom under the principle of 
secularism, and principle of pluralism within its slogan of “liberty, equality, fraternity.” Those 
principles contain the notion that government and society must be protected from religious 
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overreaching in order to preserve its secular and plural nature, whereas freedom of religion is one 
of the foundations of a democratic society.  
 
That is to say, that different religions shall co- exist, and France shall allow religions to flourish 
in society so long as this flourishing does not violate specifically defined limitation clauses. 
Meaning, that such limitations shall not require a religious believer to be distorted by the 
limitations imposed. To the extent that the principle of secularism in the SAS v France case 
functions as an exclusionary machinery of religious views, it goes into conflict with the robust 
principle of pluralism and principle of secularism embraced by the French constitution which was 
inspired by the Convention. Consequently, the endorsement of such an act is in conflict as it 
violates the principle of pluralism, as well the principles of democratic society. 
 
Based on all the facts provided, as question still remains: is the burqa ban was necessary in a 
democratic society?  It is important to realize that the restriction clause must be proportionate, 
which  
 (…) requires a balancing act under which the Court asks whether the interference with the 
right is more extensive than is justified by the legitimate aim.
208
  
Namely, whether a limitation on religious freedom is proportionate depends on whether the 
measures adopted are disproportionate for the defense of the juridical good that has given rise to 
restriction. 
209
 The principle “necessary in a democratic society” is of great importance due to the 
fact that this potential limitation clause allows wide discretionary power for the Court when 
condoning or condemning interferences, meanwhile states aim to pursue justifiability within right 
and freedom of Article 9 by reference on one of the legitimate purposes in the second paragraph 
of Article 9.Indeed, the Court being a supranational court within its main goal to review the legal 
measures adopted in an adjustment between the guarantee of human rights law of the Convention 
and dignity and respect towards peculiarities of legal order of France, that also shall reflect a 
certain concept of the protection of European Public order within the determination of the 
purpose of the Convention.  
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4. THE RELIANCE OF THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE 
The reliance on the “margin of appreciation” refers to the space for maneuver that the Strasbourg 
organs are willing to grant national authorities with respect to their fulfillment of the 
Convention.
210
 When applying the margin of appreciation, we must consider on one side the 
applicants wish to manifest his/her religious belief which is a fundamental right within a 
democratic society that needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism, as well as diversity. On the other 
hand, there is the need for integration and the importance of maintaining public order.  
That is to say, that the “margin of appreciation” refers to the flexibility granted to the states in 
their observance of rights and, in particular, to the application of the various exceptions to the 
Convention. The aim is to avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and a concrete 
Member State, while ensuring the balance between its sovereignty and its responsibilities under 
the Convention.
211
 The principles discussed in previous chapters are within a tandem to the 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. Meaning that, it is an essential aspect to 
consider when evaluating whether the national authorities have overstepped the margin or not.
212
  
These efforts to reach a balance in the SAS v France case between competing sides has generated 
a substantial controversy in Europe. A controversy that, the jurisprudence of the Court has 
resolved by always accepting the recourse to the margin of appreciation doctrine in favor of the 
State by approving its restrictions on religious freedom.
213
 Further, in the SAS v France case the 
state of France has been granted the margin of appreciation, but since it is not unlimited, it should 
reconcile with the Convention. Further, acknowledgement that the state of France is situated 
better with respect to a globally accepted human rights law perspective, in order to resolve this 
controversy. That is due to the lack of consensus in the jurisprudence of the Court with respect to 
the burqa. Even though the state of France may be in a better position to assess the factual and 
legal domestic circumstances, the Court has emphasized a priori position, being qualified to 
process interpretation of those conditions on a national level. 
214
As well as to interpret 
consequences on incoherencies that undermines the Convention principle of effective protection 
of fundamental freedom and right by Article 9.
215
 
Based on the essence of the Convention, indeed it is for the national authorities of the state of 
France to initiate the assessment of the reality of the pressing social need to ban the burqa. This is 
implied by the notion of "necessity in a democratic society" in the context of the SAS case. 
However, the Court is empowered to observe the state of France engagements in its final ruling 
by concluding about whether a burqa ban is reconcilable with Article 9.  
 
Firstly, relying on the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court assumed that the political choice 
of the French principle of secularism could in itself justify interference on religious freedom. It 
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requires sacrifices from individuals who are willing to wear Islamic veil by their freedom of 
choice for the sake of safeguarding tolerance and religious harmony, referenced in the 
interpretation of the SAS v France judgment.
216
 All of the legal principles discussed in the 
previous chapters seem adequate to the Court to conclude in their judgment in favor of France 
and the burqa ban. 
 
Nevertheless, the ruling has brought intense debate and has been widely criticized. The criticisms 
include, firstly, that a burqa ban is a display of Islamophobia. That France, by imposing a model 
of the strict principle of secularism when applying the burqa ban, neither respects pluralism nor 
existing traditions in Europe that safeguard European public Order, nor Europe’s diversity of 
religion-state relations.  Secondly, criticism is brought towards the Court, for exceeding its 
powers on the competency in the protection of the Convention rights when granting such a wide 
discretionary power to the state of France in such a sensitive matter as the fundamental right and 
freedom of Article 9.
217
Arguments which interpret the applied margin as derogation on values 
under the Convention, lead to jurisprudence where the principle of effective protection of 
individual rights is absent. 
 
First, because of the fact, that Muslims are only a minority in population of France.
218
 With a 
notice that as prescribed by Article 9, religious freedom concerns individual’s autonomy, as it is 
private matter of each individual. Correspondingly, with a reference to Leyla v Turkey referring 
to the domestic situation provided in Turkey and social status of Muslim in the country. We must 
underline, the state of France shall not be concerned with striving to maintain a democratic 
system within the principle of pluralism in a comparison with respect to Leyla v Turkey context.
 
219
 Relating to the ban's social context, it renders practical effect highly discriminatory, while the 
ban on Islamic veil ban in Leyla  v Turkey does not discriminate against a minority, thus, the 
burqa ban within the state of France does. Having this in regard, the minority population relies on 
the Convention to receive ensured protection of their human rights.
220
 Second, there is no public 
order threat referring to burqa possible influence on the political climate in the state of France. 
 
 Whereas, referring to Leyla v Turkey, the burqa carries a political matter that distorts public 
order within a legitimate aim to restrict religious freedom. Therefore, in the SAS v France case 
the burqa lacks the political “symbolism” that it has in the case of Leyla v Turkey.221 Third, by 
implementing a complete burqa ban, the state of France wrongly assumes that all women are 
forced to wear the burqa and risks to an inevitably conflict within the protection of rights and 
freedoms of those whose choice is to veil themselves. Further, it risks undermining the potency of 
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the Convention.
222
 The prohibition on religious freedom by adopting a burqa ban targets a dress-
code (burqa) that is closely linked to religious inner faith, culture and personal convictions and, 
undoubtedly an intimate right related to one’s personality.223 As well, referring to the third 
statement, there exists an ongoing debate, whether it is incumbent on a Court to ascertain and 
support not only the objective but also the subjective meaning of this garment in France.
224
 
 
The doubt has been detected within the evaluation process towards the judgment, due to the large 
number of actors, both international and national, in the field of fundamental rights protection 
that have found a blanket ban to be disproportionate with respect to a legitimate aim.
 225
 On the 
one hand, it concerns the burqa ban legislation which might contribute to narrow the 
interpretation on the Islamic veil, affecting those whose religious conviction is to wear the veil. 
Consequently, it can encourage intolerance when the state of France has a duty to promote 
tolerance.
226
 Accordingly, it is not the duty of France to: 
 (…) assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are 
expressed (…) The role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause 
of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each 
other.
227 
On the other hand the Court acknowledged that the role of domestic circumstances within the 
state of France shall be provided special weight based on France’s democratic legitimation to 
evaluate local needs and conditions.
228
 The SAS v France case is based on politically and socially 
sensitive matters as have been analyzed in the previous chapters,
229
 where a strict conception of 
laïcité prevails, thus imbued with Republican values.230 The applied jurisdiction of the state of 
France on burqa ban serve as a limitation on religious freedom that for some academics deeply 
distorts the essence of human rights under the Convention.
231
 For some others
232
, they argue that 
the whole human rights system would collapse, if the burqa ban would not come into force.  
Further, open interpersonal relations would be forgotten, due to the effect on the Islamic veil 
within the social context and intercommunication.
233
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Importantly, in the Courts awareness of the fact that the impugned ban mainly affects Muslim 
women who wish to wear the full-face veil, stating that the ban is not expressly based on the 
religious connotation of Islamic veil but solely on the fact by itself that it conceals the face.
234
As 
Levinas stresses, the criticism is of a society in which people would not properly relate to one 
another. For him, being depersonalized is impermissible through a humanity that includes ethical 
code, derived as the moral obligation of humanity.
235
 Indeed, this argument was plausibly 
illustrated based on the account of public safety on the matters of the security risk posed by the 
burqa, with respect to the fact that face coverings might hinder the identification of individuals, 
therefore distort the French public order.
236
 As it has been emphasized in the previous concepts 
about why the French authorities give that much weight to the burqa ban, which indicates: 
(…)[t]he voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is 
quite simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of ‘living together’ in 
French society (…)237 
Moreover, the Court is able to accept that a State may find it essential to give particular weight in 
this connection to the interaction between individuals and may consider this to be adversely 
affected by the fact that some conceal their faces in public places, by stressing out: 
(…)[t]he systematic concealment of the face in public places, contrary to the ideal of 
fraternity, ... falls short of the minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for social 
interaction
238
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the impugned ban can be regarded as justifiable interference in 
its principle as it seeks to guarantee the conditions of vivre ensemble.
239
 In Europe, human rights 
prize is the freestanding religious autonomy of an individual. This is bound upon the hallmarks of 
a democratic society, pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Moreover, as interpreted in the 
SAS v France, the Islamic veil illustrates its conviction outwards and carries opinion that could be 
at odds with European values and which might in turn, in the long term, be against the essence of 
a democratic society in Europe.
240
 Based on these factual and legal prerequisites the existence of 
such a society was therefore a “necessity.” 
 
4.1. Concluding remarks on the principle of margin of appreciation  
The doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” serves as a decisive legal tool in the SAS v France 
case. It goes hand in hand with a supervision of the Court. Meaning, that the Court plays a role as 
supervisory not as a European Supreme Court. Automatically it is directly linked and dependent 
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on the enforcement of Contracting Member States, in this case France. It shall act within its 
limited mandate where the Court considers whether the state of France has taken reasonable and 
proportionate measures to safeguard rights under Article 9. 
241
  
 
The margin of appreciation has been employed to permit the state of France to respond to its own 
necessities and standards to maintain a stable national climate, while ensuring enjoyment of the 
full deliverance of religious freedom within France under the Convention
242
. When the Court 
applied the doctrine of margin of appreciation it was required to distinguish between dignity and 
tolerance that is undoubtedly a vital. Thus, the applied margin of appreciation in SAS v France 
concludes to be a blind assumption without sound legitimate aim, such as the blatant acceptance 
of customs from the side of the state of France to guarantee public order of the State. Further, the 
arguments drawn from comparative and human rights law as such militate against adopting the 
burqa ban.  
 
While it is legitimate to take into account the specific context in France, referring to the strong 
and unifying tradition of the values of the French Republic to safeguard public order. As well, the 
overwhelming principle of vivre ensemble, gender equality and strict secularism that led to the 
adoption of the burqa ban. Nonetheless, it is still a duty of the Court to ensure protection through 
article 9(1), against disproportionate interferences, that may run contradictory to human 
rights.
243
  The French constitution is viewed as an aspiration of human rights law which serves as 
the “principal basis for global human rights standards.”244  
 
Therefore, the Court shall ensure that applied margin of appreciation upholds the Convention 
with respect to France's obligation to uphold the right of freedom of religion in the context of the 
Convention to ensure public order. Accordingly, the role of the authorities in such circumstances 
is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure mutual tolerance 
between opposing groups.
245
 That is to say, European jurisdiction has accorded significantly high 
level of discretionary power when regulating religious freedom by paving the way and supporting 
the Court’s newly applied approach under which the state of Frances intrinsic behavioral social 
norms may be used to ban burqa.
246
 
 
Therefore, a cursory interpretation of the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
fundamental freedom under Article 9 suggests that Contracting parties under the Convention 
have agreed on broad and quite vague qualifications on limitation clauses. Hence, while it offers 
rights from the one hand, it withdraws them on the other. It is identifiable that the margin of 
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appreciation doctrine and supervision of the Court lacks clarity between intra and trans-national 
legal processes. On the one hand unclear determination of the extent to strike a balance between 
the demands for pluralism, national sovereignty and national identity, on the other hand, common 
consensus on religious freedom within Europe. It leaves impacts on European public order 
standards and for the transfer of power from the national states to the supranational institutions. 
Which is in fact faithful to the tenets of those documents and the jurisprudence applied 
interpreting them.
 247
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis offered in this Thesis shows that Article 9 has both theoretical and practical 
intricacies. From the theoretical point of view, the first paragraph of Article 9 states the right, 
while the second paragraph of Article 9 permits the State to interfere in individual’s right to 
religious freedom under a set of conditions established: 
 prescribed by law 
 required to meet legitimate aims;  
 necessary in a democratic society.  
 
The term “necessary” implies a balance between competing parties and the interpretation of the 
phrase necessary in a democratic society achieved with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
to safeguard the European Public order. All these concepts of limitation clauses for justifiability 
encompass the tensions created by the discrepancy between the individuals and the society. That 
is to say, that Article 9 lacks a clear determination of solid conceptual basis. The second 
paragraph of Article 9 is constructed based on rather indistinct concepts and includes the 
limitation clauses. Moreover, Article 9(1) failed to concretize the extent of protecting everyone’s 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. That resulted in a dilemma that has created 
conceptual tensions within Article 9, such as the individual religious autonomy versus rights and 
freedoms of others.  
 
 Hence in practice, Article 9 can be difficult to apply. This is largely due to the fact that in 
terminology and extent Article 9 is open to subjectivity. While there is a need to balance 
competing rights, with respect to the Convention in a particular the SAS v France, the Court is 
required to interpret each separate concept contained in the Article 9(2) and the possible 
provisions for justifiable interference. Article 9 appears to have a normative rather than truly 
adjusting character. It fails to take into account the difficulty existing in applying the margin of 
appreciation to reach a just judgment that would promote European Public order. Further, balance 
has to be struck between protection of religious autonomy of individuals, and the rights and 
freedoms of others. The judgment in the SAS v France has inclined to rely on the margin of 
appreciation by granting the state of France wide discretionary power.  
 
Therefore, the balancing of competing rights with respect to the margin of appreciation is positive 
but difficult to apply. As the analysis provided in this Thesis has shown, Article 9 has unclear 
formulation of its extent. It carries legal controversies and applies principles that include 
contradictory aspects and leave conflicting debates unresolved, and in this way, distorts European 
Public order. It seeks to eliminate arbitrary practice, by restraining the State within European 
supervision. However, the abstract term of Public order as well as the possible effects of the 
outcome of the SAS v France case are not given due consideration.  
 
Therefore, if the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been applied disproportionately, due 
to the lack of firm provisions, it can seriously undermine the stability of the Convention that 
serves as aspiration for each Contracting Member State in developing the legal principles for its 
own national legal system with respect to Human Rights Law. Above all, the Convention has to 
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be respected, regardless of procedural obstacles. Even in cases in which moral or ethical issues of 
great sensitivity are at stake, including religious freedom, the Court leaves a wide margin of 
appreciation for the Member State, so it has to be treated with utmost cautiousness to avoid 
misdirection of Human Rights Law and not to distort values that maintain European public order. 
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